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Free will, personhood, and action are allegedly foundational for
ascriptions of criminal responsibility and desert. In his newest book,
George Fletcher courageously addresses each of these topics.' This
Article suggests that recent challenges to standard conceptions of all
three are profound, threatening to undermine the justification of
criminal law as we know it. If we do not have free will, and if the law's
implicit conception of the person and explanation of action are radically
misguided, then traditional conceptions of responsibility and desert are
apparently impossible. If the person disappears, the law's justifications
for punishment and punishment practices should change accordingly.
This Article addresses these claims and considers Professor
Fletcher's position. Part I briefly draws a distinction between an
external and internal challenge to an institution, practice or doctrine.
Part II argues that there is no genuine free will problem in positive law,
but that the metaphysical free will problem does pose a complete,
external challenge to the possibility of responsibility and desert. In
particular, Fletcher's attempt to root free will in a Chomskian account
of language does not solve the problem. Part III considers the questions
of action and personhood. It first addresses the law's current dominant
conception of action, the folk psychological model. Then it turns to
Fletcher's communicative, holistic, contextualized theory of action. I
conclude that Fletcher's theory, although interesting, offers no
conceptual, empirical or normative reason to substitute it for the law's
current theory.
* Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law & Professor of Psychology and Law in
Psychiatry, University of Pennsylvania. This article was first presented at a conference to
celebrate Professor George P. Fletcher at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law in November,
2006. As always, I thank my personal attorney, Jean Avnet Morse, for her sound, sober counsel
and moral support.
I GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE,
INTERNATIONAL (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 386-481, on file with the Cardozo Law
Review) [hereinafter GRAMMAR MANUSCRIPT].
2545
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
Part IV examines contemporary critiques, based primarily in
psychological research and neuroscience, that suggest that our mental
states do no genuinely causal efficacious work in explaining our
behavior. If this critique is correct, another complete external challenge
to the possibility of responsibility and desert arises. I suggest in
contrast that these new challenges do not cast substantial doubt upon the
validity of the traditional model of personhood and action and,
therefore, they do not pose a current threat to responsibility and desert.
In short, the allegedly disappearing person is safe and fully visible. A
brief conclusion suggests that the basic sciences are unlikely soon to
displace our view of ourselves as conscious, intentional and potentially
rational agents whose behavior can be explained best by our reasons for
action.
I. INTERNAL V. EXTERNAL CRITIQUES
If one is considering the relation of any variable to an institution,
practice or set of doctrines, the variable may be used to mount either an
internal or an external critique. An internal critique accepts that the
practice or doctrine is coherent and uses the other variable to explain or
to reform the practice or doctrine. An external critique uses the other
variable to demonstrate that the practice or doctrine is incoherent tout
court.
An internal argument accepts that criminal responsibility is a
coherent concept and tries to explain the positive rules and practices we
have or to criticize those rules and practices normatively for the purpose
of improving them. For example, suppose that empirical research
discloses that automatic behavior is more extensive than we believe and
that it can be accurately evaluated retrospectively. The appropriate
legal response might be to extend the class of defendants for whom an
"automatism" defense would be appropriate. Abandoning all
responsibility and desert would not follow, however. To take another
example, one might believe on normative grounds that the criteria for
self-defense should be subjectivized to include the perceptions of a
reasonable victim of persistent domestic violence. Again, some
subjectivization of the self-defense standard would not entail denying
the possibility of responsibility tout court.
An external argument suggests that the concept of criminal
responsibility is incoherent or unjustifiable and therefore it should be
abandoned. For example, free will is thought to be inconsistent with
determinism and foundational for criminal responsibility. It may seem,
therefore, that if the universe is largely deterministic, no one can be
morally responsible. Consequently, any criminal law distinctions
2546 [Vol. 28:6
THE DISAPPEARING PERSON
concerning blame and punishment that are based on moral responsibility
ascriptions must be unjustifiable. It follows that anyone who accepts
that at least some people who commit crimes are morally responsible
and may justifiably be punished, but who also wishes to change
criminal law doctrine and practice, is necessarily making an internal
argument, at least implicitly, because the general justifiability of
responsibility-based blame and punishment is assumed.
II. THE NON-PROBLEM OF FREE WILL
This part first considers the general problem of free will, then
discusses Professor Fletcher's analysis of the issue and concludes with
the "compatibilist" response.
A. The General Free Will Problem
It is a commonplace that the assumption of free will is foundational
for our criminal law responsibility doctrines and practices. 2  The
assumption is open to various alternative interpretations, however,
which are often insufficiently distinguished. Free will and its lack
frequently are used simply as a conclusory synonym for the presence or
absence of the positive indicia of criminal culpability. Thus, for
example, a defendant who fails to meet the criteria for legal insanity is
said to have free will, and the defendant who succeeds with the defense
is said to lack it. In such usages, free will does no independent work
whatsoever in explaining the legal outcome, which is fully explained by
the presence or absence of the legal criteria for the defense.
More fundamentally, free will is sometimes taken to mean a
distinctively human ability or capacity to act independent of the causal
processes of the universe that had been operating on the agent until he
or she acted. This ability is sometimes called agent-causation or the
like, and it is a central tenet of the libertarian metaphysics of human
action. Determinism or universal causation is thought to be
incompatible with agent-causation, and, in turn, with responsibility for
action. This is a familiar metaphysical debate that has been alive for
millennia. Many believe that determinism is fully compatible with
2 See, e.g., United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 52 (1978) ("[A] deterministic view of
human conduct ... is inconsistent with the underlying precepts of our criminal justice system.");
ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 25 (5th ed. 2006) ("One of the
fundamental concepts in the justification of criminal laws is the principle of individual autonomy
.... The factual element in autonomy is that individuals in general have the capacity and
sufficient free will to make meaningful choices.").
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criminal responsibility. 3 On the other hand, many "incompatibilists"
believe either that libertarian freedom is true and necessary for
responsibility or that determinism is true and we must learn to live
without free will and responsibility (a position termed "hard
determinism").
4
The tug of hard determinism is powerful. After all, if our actions,
including violations of the criminal law, are simply the inevitable
product of deterministic or causal processes for which we are not
responsible, how can moral responsibility be possible and how can
blame and punishment based on such responsibility be fair?5 For
example, a central incompatibilist argument is that people can be
responsible only if they could have acted otherwise than they did, but if
determinism is true, they could not have acted other than they did.6
Hard determinism thus does not try either to explain or to justify our
responsibility concepts and practices. It simply assumes that genuine
responsibility is always metaphysically unjustified. Consequently, the
hard determinist claims that even if an internally coherent account of
responsibility and related practices can be given, it will be a superficial
basis for responsibility, which is only an illusion. 7
Libertarians have a difficult persuasion burden because the type of
freedom they posit seems exceptionally mysterious. How can human
beings have a capacity for choice and action that is independent of the
causal processes that have been operating on them from the moment of
conception, and, indeed, long before. Even committed libertarians
concede that agent-causation is mysterious. 8 Nonetheless, if one is
unpersuaded by the alleged compatibilism of determinism and
responsibility, and fears the loss of the concept of moral responsibility if
determinism applies to human action, then one will be motivated to try
to justify libertarian freedom. This appears to be Professor Fletcher's
response.
3 See, e.g., Peter F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in FREE WILL 59 (Gary Watson ed.,
1982); R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS (1994).
4 See generally DERK PEREBOOM, LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL (2001). Fletcher never says
that free will is a necessary condition of just punishment, but he offers an explanation of
libertarian freedom that he seems to endorse. GRAMMAR MANUSCRIPT, supra note 1, at 404-08;
see infra Part tt.B.
5 See Galen Strawson, The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility, 75 PHIL. STUDIES 5 (1994)
(providing the "basic argument" for why responsibility is impossible).
6 This is sometimes called the "principle of alternate possibilities." It has generated endless
disputes between incompatibilists, who believe it is flatly inconsistent with responsibility, and
compatibilists, who believe that it is not inconsistent with responsibility. See WALLACE, supra
note 3, at 115-17, 251-65.
7 See SAUL SMILANSKY, FREE WILL AND ILLUSION 40-73, 145-219 (2000) (arguing that free
will is an illusion, but an illusion that is indispensable).
8 See, e.g., RICHARD TAYLOR, METAPHYSICS 53 (4th ed. 1992).
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B. Professor Fletcher on Free Will
Professor Fletcher defends the possibility of libertarian freedom by
using the theory of language Noam Chomsky developed. 9 Fletcher
claims that determinism presupposes a finite number of causal factors
that can generate predictions of all our actions, which would themselves
be finite and countable. Chomsky's theory suggests, in contrast, that
the number of sentences that we can create in a natural language is
infinite. Fletcher asserts that there is "no way that a determinist model
can account for everything we might say,"' 10 and he concludes in part
from this premise that our concept of responsibility is derived from our
freedom of speech."I
With respect, however, the premise is a non-sequitur, and the
conclusion is simply an assertion that cannot follow from the premise.
In principle, a natural language may be able to produce an infinite
number of sentences, but, in practice, any sentence actually produced
may be fully explained by the causal processes that created it. If there
were not causal influences at work, it would be hard to explain why one
sentence rather than another was uttered. In short, the sentences (or any
other phenomena that may be potentially infinitely variable) would be
random or indeterminate and hardly a secure foundation for freedom.
Professor Fletcher also claims that a computer could not be
programmed to recognize new terms, to tell jokes, or to create poetry.
He assumes that when speech is combined with other forms of action,
the possibilities are both infinite and unprogrammed. The implication is
that, as a consequence, humans have some special form of freedom.
The assertion that a particularly complicated computer could not be
programmed to perform these activities is simply stipulative, however.
Once again, the possibility of infinite variability of a phenomenon does
not mean that it is not fully caused or capable of being "programmed."
Professor Fletcher also uses John Searle's famously controversial
"Chinese Room" argument to bolster Fletcher's claim about freedom
based on the alleged impossibility of the deterministic production of
language. We need not consider the details of Searle's argument,
however, because it was not developed to prove acausal freedom for the
workings of the mind. It was originally generated to refute within the
philosophy of mind the thoroughly materialist claim of strong artificial
intelligence that the brain is identical to a computer. 12 If the argument
9 GRAMMAR MANUSCRIPT, supra note 1, at 404.
10 Id. at 405.
11 Id. at 406.
12 JOHN SEARLE, MIND: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION 88-92, 100-02 (2004) (briefly presenting
both the argument and the objections to it).
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goes through-a very big "if" 13-it shows only that a computer can
understand syntax but not meaning or semantics. Fletcher concludes,
probably correctly, that if humans were programmed deterministically
to answer questions that they did not understand, they would also not
understand their own answers. At most, however, one can conclude that
the brain is not precisely like a computer, or, at least, not precisely like
the computers we can now create. Even if this is correct, however, it
does not entail that the brain's functioning and our consequent behavior
cannot be understood deterministically or causally.14 Computers are not
the only deterministic mechanisms on earth, and Fletcher fails to
confront the possibility that computer programs cannot fully simulate
the capacity of natural selection to develop new, non-mysterious and
deterministic forms, such as brains capable of understanding meaning.'
5
Finally, the non-reducibility of a phenomenon does not entail that it is
acausal.
C. The Compatibilist Solution
I suggest that all such arguments that depend on understanding the
relation between brain and mind are premature for understanding
libertarian freedom because we do not have a clue to how the brain
enables the mind. 16  Given our increasingly sophisticated causal
understanding of the natural world, however, the default position about
any natural phenomenon, including human behavior, must be that it can
be understood causally. This is especially true because phenomena
formerly considered mysterious are constantly revealing their causal
mechanisms as a result of better theories and methods of investigation.
Moreover, those phenomena that appear irreducibly indeterministic
provide no secure foundation for responsibility. If one's brain works
like a random number generator, one would hardly be accountable for
13 See SAMUEL GUTTENPLAN, MIND'S LANDSCAPE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 296-303 (2000) (evaluating the "Chinese Room" argument and noting that
many functionalists think that it has been answered). See generally Daniel C. Dennett & John R.
Searle, "The Mystery of Consciousness": An Exchange, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, December 21,
1995, at 42 (vigorously debating the validity of the argument).
14 Fletcher's use of the argument is particularly inapt because the argument presupposes a
computer that could provide rules to answer the questions put to the subject in a language the
subject does not understand. In other words, the subject could use the program to answer
appropriately with symbols any question put to it, but the subject would not understand the
answers the subject was giving. If this is possible in principle, as Searle's argument implies, then
the potential infinite variation in interrogative sentences can be deterministically and syntactically
understood and answered by the computer program.
15 See DANIEL C. DENNETI, FREEDOM EVOLVES 47-51 (2003) (explaining why computer
models cannot simulate the complexity of evolutionary processes and arguing that determinism
does not entail inevitability).
16 PAUL MCHUGH & PHILLIP SLAVNEY, PERSPECTIVES OF PSYCHIATRY 11-12 (2d ed. 1998).
2550 [Vol. 28:6
THE DISAPPEARING PERSON
its products, including actions. Criminal theorists should unflinchingly
accept that we live in a causal universe-that people are part of that
natural, causal universe-and consider what follows from these truths.
Compatibilism is the thesis that determinism or causation and
responsibility are not inconsistent or incompatible.' 7  In brief, the
compatibilist argues that responsibility is possible if an agent has the
general capacity to guide his or her actions by good reason and is not
compelled to act by threats or other unjustifiable pressures. No
uncontroversial solution to the problem of determinism, free will and
responsibility is possible and could conceivably persuade everyone.
There are no decisive, analytically incontrovertible arguments to resolve
the metaphysical question of the relation between determinism,
libertarian free will and responsibility. The question is metaphysical,
not scientific. Indeed, the debate is so fraught that even theorists who
adopt the same general approach to the metaphysical challenge
substantially disagree. Nevertheless, the view one adopts has profound
consequences for legal (and moral) theory and practice, so let us turn to
the virtues of compatibilism.
Compatibilists reject libertarianism because it is implausible 8 and
have three basic answers to the hard determinist challenge. First, they
claim that responsibility attribution and related practices are human
activities constructed by us for good reason, and that they need not
conform to any ultimate metaphysical facts about genuine or "ultimate"
responsibility.' 9 Indeed, some compatibilists deny that conforming to
ultimate metaphysical facts is even a coherent goal in this context.
Second, compatibilism holds that our positive doctrines of responsibility
are fully consistent with determinism. Third, compatibilists believe that
our responsibility doctrines and practices are normatively desirable and
consistent with moral, legal and political theories that we firmly
embrace. The first claim is theoretical; the third is primarily normative.
There are very powerful arguments for the first and third claims. 20 For
the purpose of my argument, however, the second claim is the most
important.
Let us begin with the most general responsibility and excusing
conditions. The capacity for rationality is the primary responsibility
17 There are many different compatibilist perspectives but all are unified by the central thesis
that determinism and responsibility are compatible. See THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL
181-277 (Robert Kane ed., 2002) (providing various compatibilist perspectives).
18 See Strawson, supra note 3, at 80 (referring to libertarian metaphysics as "panicky");
HILARY BOK, FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 42-51 (1998) (explaining why libertarianism
cannot provide the type of freedom that it alleges responsibility requires).
19 See WALLACE, supra note 3, at 5.
20 See James Lenman, Compatibilism and Contractualism: The Possibility of Moral
Responsibility, 117 ETHICS 7 (2006); Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results and Criminal
Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 437-44.
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criterion, and its lack is the primary excusing condition. Now, it is
simply a fact about human beings that they have different capacities for
rationality in general and in specific contexts. For example, young
children in general have less rational capacity than adults. It is also true
that rationality differences differentially affect agents' capacity to grasp
and to be guided by good reason. Differences in rational capacity and
its effects are real even if determinism is true. Compulsion is also an
excusing condition, but it is simply another fact about human beings
that some people act in response to external or internal hard choice
threats to which persons of reasonable firmness might yield, and that
most people most of the time are not in such situations when they act.
This is true even if determinism is true and even if people could not
have acted otherwise.
More specifically, consider the doctrines of criminal responsibility.
Assume that the defendant has caused a prohibited harm. Prima facie
responsibility requires that the defendant's behavior was action and
performed with a requisite mental state. Now, it is simply true that
some bodily movements are intentional and performed in a state of
reasonably integrated consciousness and some are not. It is also true
that some defendants possess the requisite mental state and some do not.
The truth of determinism does not mean that actions are
indistinguishable from non-actions or that mental states do not exist.
Even if determinism is true, these facts are also true and make a
perfectly rational legal difference according to theories of responsibility
and punishment we embrace. Indeed, causal processes can help explain
why some human activity is action and some is not. Determinism is
fully consistent with prima facie guilt and innocence.
Now consider the defenses of insanity and duress. Some people
with mental disorder do not know right from wrong; others do. In cases
of potential duress, some people face a hard choice that a person of
reasonable firmness would yield to and most people do not.21 Once
again, different legal responses based on these differences make perfect
sense according to dominant retributive and consequential theories of
punishment. A causal account can explain how these variations were
caused to occur, but it does not mean that they do not exist.
Determinism is fully consistent with both the presence and absence of
affirmative defenses. In sum, the legal criteria used to identify which
defendants are criminally responsible map onto real behavioral
differences that justify different legal responses.
The claim that our criminal responsibility doctrines are founded on
libertarian freedom is simply false as a matter of positive law. Free
21 Note that the doctrinal criteria for duress have nothing to do with libertarian freedom or its
opposite. Duress exists when a defendant is placed in a hard, "do-it-or-else," choice situation
through no fault of his or her own.
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will, or its lack, is not a criterion of any legal doctrine, and all doctrines
of criminal law are fully compatible or consistent with the truth of
determinism or causation. A radical external challenge based on the
truth of determinism is thus possible only if we must embrace hard
determinism as the incontrovertible metaphysical truth, with the
inevitable moral and legal consequence that no one is ever genuinely
responsible for what he or she does and never genuinely deserves praise
or blame, reward or punishment. The question, then, is whether as
rational agents we must swallow our pride, accept hard determinist
incompatibilism because it is so self-evidently true and somehow
transform the criminal justice system accordingly.
Compatibilism is a defensible and attractive alternative to the
"panicky" metaphysics of libertarianism and the bleak perspective of
hard determinism. Because compatibilism is consistent with our
responsibility practices and their centrality, and because there is and
cannot be any incontrovertible theoretical or empirical reason to reject
it, we have good reason to embrace compatibilism. There may be good
empirical and normative reasons to reform various responsibility
doctrines and practices, but there is no metaphysical reason concerning
free will to abandon them entirely.
III. PERSONHOOD AND ACTION
This part addresses the law's traditional view of the person and
agency that is rooted in the folk psychological theory that explains
behavior employing desires, beliefs, and intentions. It then considers
Professor Fletcher's communicative theory of action.
A. Traditional Concepts of Personhood and Action
Consciousness and action are central to the law's view of the
person. They are at the heart of both common sense and the conception
of the person inherent in judgments about responsibility and culpability.
The capacity for intentional activity or stillness-the capacity for
agency-is a central aspect of personhood and is integral to what it
means to be a responsible person. We act because we intend.
Responsibility judgments depend on the mental states that produce and
accompany our bodily movement and stillness. This is how we think
about ourselves, and this is the concept of the person that morality and
law both reflect.
The law's view of the person is thus the so-called "folk
psychological" model: a conscious (and potentially self-conscious)
2007] 2553
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creature capable of practical reason, an agent who forms and acts on
intentions that are the product of the person's desires and beliefs. We
are the sort of creatures that can act for and respond to reasons. The law
does not treat persons generally as non-intentional creatures or
mechanical forces of nature. It could not be otherwise. Law and
morality are action-guiding 22 and could not guide people ex ante and ex
post unless people were the types of creatures who could use rules as
premises in their practical reasoning. Law and morality as action-
guiding normative systems of rules are otherwise useless and perhaps
incoherent. Law is a system of rules that at the least is meant to guide or
influence behavior and thus to operate as a potential cause of behavior.
As John Searle writes,
Once we have the possibility of explaining particular forms of
human behavior as following rules, we have a very rich explanatory
apparatus that differs dramatically from the explanatory apparatus of
the natural sciences. When we say we are following rules, we are
accepting the notion of mental causation and the attendant notions of
rationality and existence of norms .... The content of the rule does
not just describe what is happening, but plays a part in making it
happen.2
3
Legal and moral rules are not simply mechanistic causes that
produce "reflex" compliance. They operate within the domain of
practical reason. Agents are meant to and can only use these rules as
potential reasons for action as they deliberate about what they should
do. Moral and legal rules are thus action-guiding primarily because
they provide an agent with good moral or prudential reasons for
forbearance or action. Unless people were capable of understanding
and then using legal rules as premises in deliberation, law would be
powerless to affect human behavior.24  People use legal rules as
premises in the practical syllogisms that guide much human action. No
"instinct" governs how fast a person drives on the open highway, for
22 GEORGE SHER, IN PRAISE OF BLAME 123 (2006) (Although philosophers disagree about the
requirements and justifications of what morality requires, there is widespread agreement that "the
primary task of morality is to guide action.").
23 John R. Searle, End of the Revolution, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 28, 2002, at 33, 35
(emphasis in original).
24 See Scott J. Shapiro, Law, Morality and the Guidance of Conduct, 6 LEGAL THEORY 127,
131 (2000). This view assumes that law is sufficiently knowable to guide conduct, but a contrary
assumption is largely incoherent. As Shapiro writes:
Legal skepticism is an absurd doctrine. It is absurd because the law cannot be the sort
of thing that is unknowable. If a system of norms were unknowable, then that system
would not be a legal system. One important reason why the law must be knowable is
that its function is to guide conduct.
Id. I do not assume that legal rules are always clear and thus capable of precise action guidance.
If most rules in a legal system were not sufficiently clear most of the time, however, the system




example. But among the various explanatory variables, the posted
speed limit and the belief in the probability of paying the consequences
for exceeding it surely play a large role in the driver's choice of speed.
I am not suggesting that human behavior cannot be modified by
means other than influencing deliberation or that human beings always
deliberate before they act. Of course it can and of course they don't.
Law operates through practical reason, however, even when we most
habitually follow the legal rules. Law can directly and indirectly affect
the world we inhabit only by its influence on practical reason.
The legal view of the person is not that all people always reason
and behave consistently rationally according to some pre-ordained,
normative notion of rationality. It is simply that people are creatures
who act for and consistently with their reasons for action and who are
generally capable of minimal rationality according to mostly
conventional, socially constructed standards.
Virtually everything for which we deserve to be praised, blamed,
rewarded or punished is the product of mental causation and, in
principle, responsive to reason. Machines may cause harm, but they
cannot do wrong, and they cannot violate expectations about how we
ought to live together. Only people can violate expectations of what
they owe each other, and only people can do wrong. Machines do not
deserve praise, blame, reward or punishment. Machines do not deserve
concern and respect simply because they exist. These concepts apply
only to potentially acting, intentional agents.
The foregoing picture of the person and responsibility is entirely
familiar, but it is open to profound objection. Most fundamentally,
action and consciousness are scientific and conceptual mysteries. 25 We
do not know how the brain enables the mind, and we do not know how
action is possible. At most we have hypotheses or a priori arguments. 26
Moreover, causation by mental states seems to depend on now largely
discredited mind-brain dualism that treats minds and brains as separate
entities that are somehow in communication with one another. How can
such tenuously understood concepts be justifiable premises for legal
practices such as blaming and punishing?
One answer is rooted in common sense, a plausible theory of mind
and practical necessity. Virtually every neurologically intact person
consistently has the experience of first person agency-the experience
that one's intentions flow from one's desires and beliefs and ensue in
25 See generally ROBERT AUDI, ACTION, INTENTION, AND REASON 1-4 (1993) (describing the
"basic theoretical divisions" in each of the four major problem areas in action theory); COLIN
MCGINN, THE MYSTERIOUS FLAME: CONSCIOUS MINDS IN A MATERIAL WORLD (1999)
(describing the immense difficulty of explaining consciousness and doubting the ability of human
beings to do so).
26 For example, see Professor Fletcher's argument that actions are communications.
GRAMMAR MANUSCRIPT, supra note 1, at 408. 1 address the argument in infra Part III.B.
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action. Indeed, this folk psychological experience is so central to
human life and so apparently explanatory that it is difficult to imagine
giving it up or what type of discovery could give us good reason to do
so, even if it were possible to give it up. As the eminent philosopher of
mind, Jerry Fodor, has written,
[I]f commonsense intentional psychology were really to collapse,
that would be, beyond comparison, the greatest intellectual
catastrophe in the history of our species; if we're that wrong about
the mind, then that's the wrongest we've ever been about anything.
The collapse of the supernatural, for example, didn't compare ...
Nothing except, perhaps, our commonsense physics . . . comes as
near our cognitive core as intentional explanation does. We'll be in
deep, deep trouble if we have to give it up .... But be of good
cheer; everything is going to be all right.
27
Moreover, the folk psychological theory has much explanatory
power and is capable of scientific investigation.
28
The plausible theory of mind that might support such explanations
is thoroughly material but non-reductive and non-dualist. It
hypothesizes that all mental and behavioral activity is the causal product
of lawful physical events in the brain, that mental states are real, that
they are caused by lower level biological processes in the brain, that
they are realized in the brain (the mind-brain) but not at the level of
neurons, and that mental states can be causally efficacious.
29
Moreover, there is a perfectly plausible evolutionary story about
why folk-psychology is causally explanatory and why human beings
need rules such as those law provides. 30 We have evolved to be self-
conscious creatures that act for reasons. Practical reason is inescapable
for creatures like ourselves who inevitably care about the ends they
pursue and about what reason they have to act in one way rather than
another. 31 Because we are social creatures whose interactions are not
governed primarily by innate repertoires, it is inevitable that rules will
27 JERRY FODOR, PSYCHOSEMANTICS: THE PROBLEM OF MEANING IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
Mind xii (1987).
28 See, e.g., BERTRAM F. MALLE, How THE MIND EXPLAINS BEHAVIOR: FOLK
EXPLANATIONS, MEANING, AND SOCIAL INTERACTION (2004) [hereinafter MALLE, How THE
MIND EXPLAINS BEHAVIOR] (providing a full theoretical account and empirical support). There
is also growing recognition within psychology that "mental state inference is one of the most
fundamental tools of social cognition." Bertram F. Malle, Folk Theory of Mind: Conceptual
Foundations of Human Cognition, in THE NEW UNCONSCIOUS 225, 229 (Ran R. Hassin et al.
eds., 2005) [hereinafter Malle, Folk Theory of Mind].
29 See, e.g., SEARLE, supra note 12, at 113-14 (terming his position "biological naturalism"
about consciousness).
30 See JOHN R. SEARLE, FREEDOM & NEUROBIOLOGY: REFLECTIONS ON FREE WILL,
LANGUAGE, AND POLITICAL POWER 69-70 (2007) (arguing that conscious rationality is such an
important feature of our lives and so "expensive" that it is implausible that evolutionary processes
caused such states to be epiphenomenal).
31 BOK, supra note 18, at 75-91, 129-31, 146-51.
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be necessary to help order our interactions in any minimally complex
social group.32 Human beings have developed extraordinarily diverse
ways of living together, but a ubiquitous feature of all societies is that
they are governed by rules addressed to beings capable of following
those rules. As Fodor notes, one of the most basic, well-justified
assumptions about human nature is that we are consciously intentional
creatures that are capable of a great deal of rationality. At the very
least, we remain entitled to presume that conscious intentions are causal
and to place the burden of persuasion at a very high level on those who
wish to substitute another account.
Finally, the criminal law is an entirely practical, normative
enterprise that must guide and order human interaction. It cannot avoid
committing itself to some theory of personhood and action. The default
position must be what common sense and every day experience dictate
unless there is powerfully good evidence to indicate that common sense
is a massive group delusion about ourselves. 33
Before turning to whether there is reason to abandon this default
position, let us first consider Professor Fletcher's understanding of the
nature of action, which he agrees is central to criminal law.
B. Professor Fletcher on Action
Professor Fletcher agrees that it makes no sense to blame and
punish other species that lack full agency and cannot act for reasons in
part because they lack language. 34 Thus, for Fletcher, agency is as
crucial for responsibility as it is in traditional accounts, but he is not
convinced by traditional views of action. At times he seems concerned
with what action essentially is, with whether it is a natural kind. At
other times he seems more concerned to infer the nature of the positive
law's model of action. He appears to conclude that the question for law
can be solved only philosophically, implying that psychology,
neuroscience and other potentially relevant disciplines have little to
add.35 This seems odd because if the best explanation of the law's
concept of action does violence to empirical discoveries about human
behavior, the normative implications would be large. Fletcher knows
32 LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES & THE
DILEMMAS OF LAW 11-25 (2001) (explaining why rules are necessary in a complex society and
contrasting their account with H.L.A. Hart's theory).
33 See generally Katrina L. Sifferd, In Defense of the Use of Commonsense Psychology in the
Criminal Law, 25 LAW AND PHIL. 571 (2006) (providing an extensive defense of the truth of folk
psychology that underpins criminal law and claiming that criminal law therefore does not need to
seek a substitute).
34 GRAMMAR MANUSCRIPT, supra note 1, at 389.
35 Id. at 390.
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that criminal law is a distinctly normative enterprise.
1. Fletcher's Attack on the Traditional Account of Action
Professor Fletcher's account begins with a bi-frontal assault on the
notion that action is a "willed" or "volitional" bodily movement. 36 The
first front denies the validity of the "causal" theory of action that posits
the will or volitions as mental causes of action.37 Fletcher is certainly
correct that all attempts to identify the final mental mechanism that
produces action have faced intense criticism on conceptual and
empirical grounds.38 There are two difficulties, however. Attempts to
provide better accounts of the "causal" theory abound and have not all
been decisively refuted or even refuted at all. More important, the truth
of mental causation is widely accepted without having also to accept a
homuncular account. 39 Furthermore, as Part IV argues, it has not been
refuted empirically or philosophically. Action is mysterious, to be sure.
Neither philosophy nor neuroscience nor any other discipline has
provided an incontrovertible account of how mental causation is
possible, but it is still a dominant view of human action and best
explains ordinary human experience.
Accepting the validity of the mental causation of action does not
entail that one also must accept mind-body dualism or the validity of the
metaphysically dubious account of libertarian agent-causation. The
language of mental causation does suggest dualism, but this is simply a
feature of our language rather than a position on the metaphysics of
action.40 The folk psychological theory of action sketched above,41 for
example, is unitary but makes reasons causally central. Contra Professor
Fletcher's assertion,42 the causalist does not posit a "ghost" in the
36 GRAMMAR MANUSCRIPT, supra note 1, at 391.
37 Id. at 392-93.
38 See, e.g., GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 62-82 (1949) (providing an influential
critique of the concept of "will").
39 Among philosophers, see, for example, Robert Audi, Mental Causation: Sustaining and
Dynamic, in MENTAL CAUSATION 53 (John Heil & Alfred Mele eds., 1993) [hereinafter MENTAL
CAUSATION]; MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS AND PRACTICAL REASON 53ff (1987);
Donald Davidson, Thinking Causes, in MENTAL CAUSATION, supra at 3; SEARLE, supra note 12,
at 211-14. Among psychologists, see, for example, MALLE, HOW THE MIND EXPLAINS
BEHAVIOR, supra note 28; Malle, Folk Theory of Mind, supra note 28.
40 It is almost impossible not to talk "dualistically" in ordinary speech and writing. Every
time a monist neuroscientist uses a personal pronoun in speaking or writing, for example, he or
she seems to him imply that there is a genuine him or her that is somehow distinguishable from
his or her brain activity. This does not mean, however, that the neuroscientist (or anyone else) is
really a crypto-dualist. It is simply at present an inevitable feature of language, and perhaps it
will always be.
41 See supra Part III.A.
42 GRAMMAR MANUSCRIPT, supra note 1, at 420. Interestingly, Fletcher's holistic account,
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machine nor an "internal" and "external" side to the action, but there is
simply no non-clunky way to express mental causation without
sounding dualistic. Moreover, the desires, beliefs and intentions that
produce actions are almost certainly themselves the product of lawful
causes. Indeed, I believe the task of evolutionary theory and
neuroscience is not reductively "to explain away" mental causation, but
to provide a physical explanation for how mental causation is possible.
Fletcher has not provided a persuasive account to defeat the common
sense view that mental causation is a correct account of the mechanism
of action.
The second front, attacking the notion that action requires
"movement," is more successful. 43 When human beings have a duty to
move for the benefit of others is indeed a vexed question, as Professor
Fletcher notes,44 but under what conditions stillness or motionlessness
should be considered action seems to him much less vexed. Fletcher
gives a set of illuminating examples of cases in which the agent's
stillness is rationalizable and explained by the agent's reasons for
remaining still. Behaving intentionally for a reason, whether by
movement or stillness, is the classical foundation for ascribing agency
and accountability to the agent. Movement and motionlessness are of
course distinguishable as phenomena, but for the normative purposes of
the criminal law, both may be justifications for responsibility if they are
attributable to the person's agency. There is little conceptual reason not
to consider some cases of stillness action, and there is much to be
gained in terms of parsimony.
2. Fletcher's Communicative or Humanistic Theory of Action
As an alternative to the dominant causal theory of action, Professor
Fletcher offers a "communicative" theory, which he claims is a
"humanistic" approach that draws "on the practice of communication
within particular cultures defined by their languages. '45 He says that
"[t]he place to begin is not with the actor's intention but with the way in
which we, as observers, understand whether motion or nonmotion
constitutes action," and that "[w]e know that somebody is acting in
much the same way we understand the meaning of a word or phrase. '46
But this assertion appears to confuse the substance of what an action is
even if it was persuasive, would be no more immune to the "disappearing person" critique than
the causal theory. See infra Part IV.
43 GRAMMAR MANUSCRIPT, supra note 1, at 393-96.
44 Id. at 394.
45 Id. at 409.
46 Id.
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with the epistemology of how an observer determines whether and for
what reason an agent is acting. After all, a voyager cast adrift alone on
a desert island after a shipwreck certainly acts when he or she
intentionally seeks food to satisfy hunger and to stay alive. Any
observer speaking any language would of course understand that
seeking and eating food is action. Neither observers nor shared
language are central to the substance of action.
Professor Fletcher once again chides "causalists" for seeing a
"mechanical explanation" when, he claims, understanding is what is
required.47 This criticism misunderstands the type of explanation that
the causalist insists upon, which is not some particular mental
mechanism but causation by reasons and intentions. Fletcher creates a
false dichotomy when he claims that, "[w]hile the causal theory
supposedly treats the human being as a responsive machine, the
teleological theory views the person as a seeing, goal-setting agent. 48
The causalist does not do the former and does do the latter, too. Indeed,
Fletcher's own account requires causation by reasons. After all, one can
"understand" if another is acting (the "meaning" in Fletcher's terms)
only if one can infer a reason, which we usually can from context.
Again, however, epistemology and substance are different questions.
Fletcher continues by changing the subject ever so slightly from
how we know whether an agent is acting to how we know what the
agent's intentions actually were. He is on firm ground in asserting that
the agent's mental states may often be ambiguous, even to him or
herself, and are hard to determine. Nevertheless, this is a different
problem from determining whether the agent was acting at all. Fletcher
gives the example of the four youths who surrounded the notorious
subway shooter, Bernhard Goetz, in a New York City subway car and
asked Goetz for money.49  Fletcher claims, rightly, that the
communicative import of words and other intentional actions are
ambiguous in this situation, but would anyone seriously doubt that the
four youths were acting when they approached Goetz and asked him for
money? The question here is not whether they acted but what action
they were performing.
Fletcher claims that probing the mind of the agent is unreliable, 50
but what does he mean by "probing the mind" of the agent? No one can
read minds, and sometimes mental states are ambiguous. There is a fact
of the matter, however, including ambiguity in some cases. Mental
states are crucial to responsibility ascriptions and, consequently, we
must try as best we can to reach accurate inferences about what was in
47 Id. at 411.
48 Id. at 421.
49 Id. at 412-13.
50 Id. at 413.
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the mind of the agent. Only then can we fairly attribute blame and
impose punishment. If the prosecution is unable to prove a mental state
beyond a reasonable doubt in an ambiguous case, the defendant is
acquitted of the crime requiring that mental state.
Consider the assessment of Goetz's mental state. He honestly
believed that he was in serious danger and admitted that he meant to kill
the boys. No one seriously doubts this. His five shots were surely
intentional action meant to kill them and would be understood as such
by anyone who understood what a gun was, whatever the observer's
language might be. The real question is whether it was reasonable for
Goetz to infer from the youths' conduct that they intended to injure him
seriously. This is not a question about what an action is or even how we
determine what his mental state was. We know that Goetz's conduct
was action and why he did it. It is a normative question about what
inferences we are entitled to draw under what conditions that would
justify the use of deadly self-defense. Goetz did not know the intentions
of the youths because the situation was ambiguous to him (and perhaps
to them), so he had to make an "on the spot" judgment. Whether under
the circumstances he was entitled to make the judgment he did is a
distinguishable question from whether he acted and for what reason.
Professor Fletcher's discussion of the communicative theory notes
that criminal actions are infinitely variable and banally regular.5' He
draws a distinction between the effort to deal with the former by
detailed statutory language and with the latter by "verbal pictures" of
paradigmatic offenses. 52 Fletcher is correct that "regulatory" types of
offenses often require more detailed elements than obvious cases of
aggression and dispossession that are at the core of the criminal law.5 3
The observation is illuminating, but it is not clear how it contributes to a
communicative theory of what action is. It is more usefully an
explanation of when action descriptions need to be more detailed so that
observers can determine if the action was performed. The observation
does not contribute to an explanation of action itself.
Professor Fletcher worries that there is a "temptation to integrate
elements of culpability into the theory of action," 54 but the source of his
worry is unclear, and, indeed, he seems ambivalent about whether it is a
genuine problem. He is correct that one must distinguish the intention
implicit in action itself from the intention required by the definition of a
criminal offense. Intentionally shooting a gun, for example, is an
action, but it is not a violation of criminal law unless it also done, say,




54 Id. at 420.
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theorists of making this "mistake," 55 but I do not think that most
American scholars, for example, fail to make this distinction. He then
cites approvingly the theory of the German scholar, Gunther Jakob,
which shares Fletcher's view that "action must be understood as the
expression of meaning," 56 and which treats a criminal action "as an
expression of contempt for the binding legal norm. ' 57 Is Professor
Fletcher criticizing or endorsing the integration of action and
culpability?
Once again, however, the point being made is unclear. We can
distinguish among whether human motion or nonmotion is action,
whether that action should be made the subject of criminal prohibition
(that is, whether it is prima facie culpable to engage in it), and whether
that action expresses contempt for the binding legal norm. These
distinctions are not novel or surprising and certainly worth pursuing. It
seems, however, that they tell us very little about the nature of action
itself. Instead, these distinctions properly highlight that actions have
meanings, and such meanings are important to just ascriptions of
culpability. Our intentions based on our reasons for action are the royal
road to our attitudes towards other agents and society in general. The
problem, once again, is which meaning ought to govern: the meaning
the agent intended to communicate or the meaning that observers infer
from the agent's activity and the surrounding circumstances? But why
would we ever want to blame and punish an agent for a meaningful
action that the observers believe expressed contempt for criminal law
norms, for example, but which the agent did not mean in that way at all?
Professor Fletcher situates his analysis of action in a project to
produce a universal, "transcultural anchor that would extract criminal
law from the relativistic viscissitudes of politics and shifting
moralities. ' 58 He recognizes that at least one aspect of the system
should be neutral and nonlocal, but he doubts whether a theory of action
could satisfy this goal. He understands that his reliance on language,
which is quintessentially "local," as the basis for his theory of action
puts the project at risk. 59 But, once again, there is a conflation of
distinct questions. One question is whether the criteria for action can be
universal. This seems not implausible as a matter of evolutionary
theory if we consider the universal truth that human beings act for
55 Id. at 421 (citing the German theorist, Welzel).
56 Id. at 422.
57 The "contempt" notion is not novel. In the philosophy of responsibility, the "reactive
sentiments" theory pioneered by P.F. Strawson has rooted our responsibility practices in the
attitudes towards us that the behavior of others indicates and in the reactive sentiments that
victims and society are justified in having and expressing in response. See Strawson, supra note
3.





The next question is whether particular actions will necessarily
have the same universal meaning. Professor Fletcher thinks not, and he
is surely right. Believing that this is an insoluble problem gives up the
quest ab initio for a universal theory of action, which will almost
certainly be stripped of most content. If Fletcher would abandon the
view that communicative meaning is a criterion for action, his search
for a universal theory would have greater chance for success.
The possibility of variable meanings for similar human motion and
nonmotion does not mean that no universals about the content of
prohibitions exist. It means only that the expression of contempt for the
same norms can vary, even if the norms do not. To use Professor
Fletcher's example, a gesture that would threaten unprovoked physical
aggression in one culture might be an indication of warm friendship in
another, but both cultures would almost certainly have some norm about
unprovoked aggression. Indeed, we know that there is enormous
agreement within the United States and cross-culturally about the
ordinal rankings of the core harms the criminal law prohibits.
60
The last, related aspect of Professor Fletcher's theory of action that
I wish to consider is how actions should be described, a question that
could be asked both of a metaphysical account of action and a criminal
law account of what should be included within action descriptions.
Fletcher accuses Western criminal justice of the "dogma" of
distinguishing action from its consequences. 61 He is right that dominant
approaches, such as the Model Penal Code, 62 do this. What is more,
doing so clearly runs afoul of his preferred "holistic" theory of action as
contextualized communication, but Professor Fletcher provides little
conceptual or normative reason to treat consequences as part of the
criteria for action.
Consider Professor Fletcher's example of a shooting. Pulling the
trigger intentionally for some reason certainly is the action of shooting.
He does not disagree. But the "contextualized" view of action he
prefers "obscures the supposed boundaries among conduct, result and
circumstances. '63 Fletcher then says that factors such as the presence of
the victim "are part of the conduct that enable us to see the shooting as
60 See Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance & Conflict in Intuitions of Justice
(December 18, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law
School) (peoples' intuitions of justice concerning the core harms of the criminal law are specific,
nuanced and widely shared cross-culturally). See also Paul H. Robinson, Robert Kurzban &
Owen D. Jones, The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice (December 18, 2006) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law School) (providing in part an
evolutionary account for the shared intuitions).
61 GRAMMAR MANUSCRIPT, supra note 1, at 423.
62 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
63 GRAMMAR MANUSCRIPT, supra note 1, at 424.
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an action, and a potentially criminal event. ' 64 With respect, I do not
understand how the presence of the victim is part of the conduct nor
why it is necessary to understand that the shooting of the gun was an
action. Unless we had reason to believe that the trigger pulling was
accidental or done in some dissociated state, we would surely conclude
that it was an action, even if we had no other information about the
context. Now, Professor Fletcher is surely right that the context may
help us determine the goal of the action and if the action is potentially
criminal, but this determination is different from evaluating whether the
shooting is an action at all. Furthermore, we could know whether the
action was potentially criminal solely from the shooter's declaration that
he intends to kill and with no further contextual information
whatsoever, including without knowing whether the shot hits or misses.
Professor Fletcher can draw the boundaries of action as he wishes, but
he provides no reason in his example to include circumstances and
results as part of the description of action tout court.
Professor Fletcher then provides a classic critique of the view that
actions and results are distinguishable as support for his view that action
descriptions must include results. The critique is more controversial
than Fletcher allows, however, and, more important, it does not support
his position about action descriptions. Those who want to distinguish
acts from results claim that a result is a matter of luck because it is not
under the person's control once a causal process intended to cause that
result has been set in motion by the agent's intentional movements. By
contrast, actions themselves are under the agent's control and thus are
not a matter of luck. Critics of this view point out that action itself may
be a matter of luck. For example, a person may form the intention to
shoot, but discovers that his trigger finger is paralyzed. Thus, even
intended actions are subject to luck. Call this the "luck reductio."
The observation that luck can affect actions themselves is
undoubtedly correct, but it does not have nearly the purchase that
Professor Fletcher claims for it. Law is a practical enterprise meant to
guide and govern ordinary human life. In virtually all cases, people
who intend to act are not paralyzed or otherwise prevented from acting
as they choose. Yes, their neuromuscular system must be intact and the
like, but why is this important? The outlier cases should not cast doubt
on the incontrovertible truth that in most cases most people are capable
of performing the intentional actions they perform to achieve the results
they intend. That intentional motions may sometimes be blocked is not
inconsistent with the possibility that motion and nonmotions exist that
are directly subject to control by reasons and intentions and that results





Professor Fletcher may be unwittingly trying to smuggle the
determinism debate into the discussion of why results matter to desert
because determinism applies to all phenomena, including actions and
results. Determinism is not the issue in our legal system, however, as
Part II discussed. Moreover, even if determinism is true, actions and
results may be distinguished. Further, determinism is not the same as
fatalism, which is the view that our deliberations make no difference.
65
Even if determinism is true, our deliberations do make a difference.
What we do intentionally changes the material condition of our lives
and the lives of others. Indeed, this is the bedrock of responsibility. If
actions generally are a matter of luck, as Fletcher implies, how could
they be the basis for responsibility under any description?
Those who mount the argument Professor Fletcher approvingly
employs about results use it for a purpose different from demonstrating
that action descriptions should include results. Rather, they use it to
argue for the justifiability .of the law's current different punishment of
attempts and results. 66 Indeed, there is nothing in the luck reductio,
even if one thinks that it succeeds, that entails that act descriptions must
include results. Fletcher's argument is one he might use to try to justify
punishing attempts less than completed crimes, but it does not aid his
quest for a contextualized theory of action that includes results in action
descriptions.
Finally, Professor Fletcher believes that the distinction between
actions on the one hand, and circumstances and results on the other,
improperly permits the causal theory of action to be maintained. He
argues that a "properly contextualized" understanding of action requires
us to think of consequences and circumstances as part of the
descriptions of actions.67 Fletcher concedes immediately, however, that
''remote" consequences and all surrounding circumstances would not be
included, but only those that would enable us to perceive that an action
is occurring. First, the proper causal theory that explains actions by
reasons and intentions is consistent with either thin or thick action
descriptions. The link between "thickness" and the causal theory is not
65 DANIEL C. DENNETT, ELBOW ROOM: THE VARIETIES OF FREE WILL WORTH WANTING
104-06 (1984) (distinguishing determinism from fatalism); ROBERT KANE, A CONTEMPORARY
INTRODUCTION TO FREE WILL 19-20 (2005) (terming the confusion one of the most "common"
in the free will debates).
66 See, e.g., MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 233-46
(1997). Professor Moore agrees with Professor Fletcher that full act descriptions should include
results-although not the description of "basic acts," such as pulling the trigger-but uses the
luck argument for the purpose I describe and not to support his position on act descriptions.
Moreover, Moore believes that results are a "poor relation" to culpability and are neither
necessary nor sufficient for it. See generally Morse, supra note 20, at 413-22 (challenging
Moore's view that results matter to desert).
67 GRAMMAR MANUSCRIPT, supra note 1, at 425 (emphasis added).
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nearly as tight as Professor Fletcher believes, so the distinction is not
necessary to support the causal theory.
It is not necessary to know results or virtually any context to know
that action is occurring. Professor Fletcher is right, of course, that we
often (but by no means always) need contextual elements to determine
the goal the action is intending to achieve-e.g., death, dispossession of
property, destruction of a dwelling-which is a crucial issue for
determining what criminal prohibition, if any, the action is violating.
This does not entail, however, that the action description must include
the further elements.
Finally, Professor Fletcher defers addressing which circumstances
and results must be included in action descriptions because they are
crucial to understanding action, 68 but this is where all the work must be
done. If the holistic, contextual communicative theory is to demonstrate
its conceptual and practical merits, we must be able to understand what
counts as a properly contextualized theory of action.
Professor Fletcher argues vigorously against the criminal law's
dominant causal view of action. If that view is properly understood as
causation by reasons and intentions and if its implications are treated
generously, this theory has all the resources to address the crucial
questions of responsibility that Fletcher agrees are central.
IV. THE DISAPPEARING PERSON?
The criminal law's view and our ordinary, common sense view of
action is that is it performed by an agent-a person or self that acts for
reasons that cause and explain the agent's conduct. Whether one
explains action causally or holistically, the theory of action presupposes
that it is a person, a self, that acts. Agents are praised and blamed,
rewarded and punished. As Professor Fletcher rightly notes: "Because
the actor is 'in charge' and the 'author,' it makes sense to poses [sic]
questions and expect answers about actions undertaken. This is what
we mean by 'accountability' for action. '69 Asking a creature or a
mechanical event that does not act for reasons to answer to charges
"makes about as much sense as expecting a door to apologize for being
closed when you run into it."70 As we have seen, there may be some
dispute about the precise contours of personhood and action, but the
core of agency as persons acting for reasons is accepted as foundational
for responsibility. For example, Fletcher believes that holistic
understanding is crucial to the description of action, but this
68 Id. at 426.
69 Id. at 397.
70 Id. at 389.
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presupposes an agent that is doing the understanding and then using it
for assessing responsibility.
Scientific, physicalist theories of the mind threaten our deeply-held
presumptions of intentionality and indeed even of personhood. What is
happening when we "act"? What is happening when we "intend" to
act? What is happening when we are apparently unable to "control" our
acts? What or who is the "we" in such questions? Some people,
including many psychologists and neuroscientists, think that new
discoveries about the causation of behavior are leading inexorably to a
mechanistic, deterministic view of the brain and thus to a purely
mechanistic view of human behavior. Daniel M'Naghten didn't shoot
that gun; it was his finger that pulled the trigger, his peripheral neurons
that caused his finger muscles to contract, and central neurons that
caused the peripheral neurons to fire, and neurons and neurons all the
way down. M'Naghten's intentions did no genuine work in explaining
his action. This is the thought that terrifies many thinking people about
scientific advances in the understanding of human behavior.
A causal determinist account would indeed become inconsistent
with our responsibility practices if scientific investigations convinced us
that we are not the types of creatures the law takes us to be--conscious
and intentional creatures who act for reasons. If the law's fundamental
presuppositions about personhood and action are wrong, our deserved
responsibility practices are simply morally unjustified according to any
moral theory we currently embrace. Although there have been many
attacks on the possibility of responsibility stemming from the free will
debate, as Part II demonstrated, these attacks could be credibly repelled
by the embrace of compatibilism. More recently, however, new
scientific discoveries allegedly cast doubt on the basic concept of the
person that the law and compatibilist responsibility theories implictly
adopt. If these doubts are accurate, compatibilism cannot save
responsibility because responsibility depends on agency, and the new
discoveries arguably deny the possibility of agency as it is traditionally
conceived.
What if agency is an illusion? What if all of the contending
conceptions depend on a mistake about human activity? What if, for
example, our reasons for actions and intentions, our conscious
understandings of ourselves and our world, do no causal work at all in
explaining our actions but are simply post-hoc rationalizations that
"make sense of' the motions or nonmotions that our brains produced?
Such speculations are not science fiction, however, or the wild
hypothetical of a law professor. They are increasingly asserted by many
investigators in psychology and the neurosciences.
The seriousness of science's potential challenge to the traditional
foundations of law and morality is best summed up in the title of an
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eminent psychologist's recent book, The Illusion of Conscious Will.71
Here is an extensive quotation from the conclusion, which is necessary
to obtain the tenor of the assertion and to evaluate if it is internally
logical:
Sometimes how things seem is more important than what they are.
This is true in theater, in art, in used car sales, in economics, and-it
now turns out-in the scientific analysis of conscious will. The fact
is, it seems to each us of that we have a conscious will. It seems we
have selves. It seems we have minds. It seems we are agents. It
seems we cause what we do. Although it is sobering and ultimately
accurate to call all this an illusion, it is a mistake to conclude that the
illusory is trivial. On the contrary, the illusions piled atop apparent
mental causation are the building blocks of human psychology and
social life. It is only with the feeling of conscious will that we can
begin to solve the problem of knowing who we are as individuals, of
discerning what we can and cannot do, and of judging ourselves
morally right or wrong for what we have done. 72
Or, to take another example from a widely-noted paper by
neuroscientists Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen, suppose that
"neuroscience holds the promise of turning the black box of the mind
into a transparent bottleneck. '73 They mean by this that the brain is the
final mechanistic pathway through which all types of explanations of
behavior must ultimately operate, and that neuroscience will be able to
demonstrate that brain mechanisms, not mental states, are doing all the
work. They speculate that we may someday possess extremely high
resolution scanners that can "simultaneously track the neural activity
and connectivity of every neuron in the human brain," and, that with the
help of computers and software, can help you see the neural events that
are alone causally responsible for your behavior. 74 If such mechanistic
understanding and knowledge were available and widespread, they are
probably correct that notions of responsibility would wither away
71 DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL (2002) [hereinafter CONSCIOUS
WILL]; see also Daniel M. Wegner, Precis of the Illusion of Conscious Will, 27 BEHAVIORAL
AND BRAIN SCIENCES 649 (2004). The precis is followed by open peer commentaries and a
response from Professor Wegner.
72 CONSCIOUS WILL, supra note 71, at 341-42. In more recent work, Professor Wegner
appears to have softened the radical interpretation of his claim, which is that we as persons, as
agents, are not really "controllers" whose mental processes cause action. Daniel M. Wegner,
Who is the Controller of Controlled Processes?, in THE NEW UNCONSCIOUS, supra note 28, at 32
("The theory is mute on whether thought does cause action."). On the other hand, Professor
Wegner seems ambivalent and loathe to fully give up the radical interpretation. See id. at 27
(arguing that the experience of conscious will is "normally a construction" and referring to mental
causation as "apparent"). This apparent ambivalence is present in the work of others.
73 Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and
Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. LOND. B 1775, 1781 (2004).
74 Id. At present, of course, scanners with this much resolving and computing powers are
sheer science fiction. The brain has about 101 cells and at least 1015 connections, and it is
plausible to assume that this scenario will always be in the realm of science fiction.
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because most would believe that it was the brain that "did it," not the
agent, and we don't hold brains morally responsible.
If accounts such as these are correct, and the implications were
properly understood, rationality would require that we either abandon
conceptions and practices of responsibility based on agency, or we learn
to live with the illusion that we are agents. The rich explanatory
apparatus of intentionality is simply a post-hoc rationalization we
hapless homo sapiens construct to explain what our brains have already
done. We are just mechanisms, although the illusion of conscious will
may play a positive role in our lives. Let us call this the "No Action
Thesis" ("NAT"). If this particular materialist and determinist view of
humans were right, that is, if we are really not acting agents at all, the
present foundations of law and morality rooted in agentic personhood
would collapse.
Let us first clarify an error that often bedevils thinking about the
relation between scientific discoveries of causes of behavior and
traditional conceptions of responsibility. Discovering a cause for
behavior, whether it is biological, psychological or sociological, does
not mean that the agent is not responsible for the behavior. All behavior
has causes. If causation were an excuse, no one could ever be held
responsible for any behavior. I have called the confused, pernicious
belief that causation excuses, which is used selectively and all too
frequently, the "fundamental psycholegal error." 75  This error is
conceptually identical to the misguided belief that determinism excuses
in our positive law.76 On the other hand, science may in fact be able to
demonstrate that we are not the types of intentional agents that we think
75 Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1592-94 (1994).
Greene and Cohen take issue with my claim about "the fundamental psycholegal error." They
suggest that, despite the law's official position, most people hold a dualistic, libertarian view of
the necessary conditions for responsibility because "vivid scientific information about the causes
of criminal behavior leads people to doubt certain individuals' capacity for moral and legal
responsibility." Greene & Cohen, supra note 73, at 1776. To prove their point, they use the
hypothetical of "Mr. Puppet," a person who has been genetically and environmentally engineered
to be a very specific type of person. Id. at 1779-80. They correctly point out that Mr. Puppet is
really no different from an identical person I shall call Mr. Puppet2 , who became the same sort of
person without intentional intervention. Yet most people might believe that Mr. Puppet is not
responsible. If so, however, shouldn't Mr. Puppe also not be responsible? After all, everyone is
a product of gene/environment interactions. But wouldn't it then follow, as Greene and Cohen
claim, that no one is responsible?
Green and Cohen are right about ordinary peoples' intuitions, of course, but people make
the fundamental psycholegal error all the time. This is a sociological observation and not a
justification for thinking causation or determinism does or should excuse behavior. After all, if
Mr. Puppet and Mr. Puppet2 are both rational agents, the compatibilist argument suggests that
they are both justifiably held responsible. The lure of purely mechanistic thinking about behavior
when causes are discovered is powerful but should be resisted.
76 See generally Stephen J. Morse, The Non-Problem of Free Will in Forensic Psychiatry and
Psychology, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 203 (2007) (addressing the two general challenges to
responsibility and concluding that neither poses a threat at present).
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we are, and that we alone are justifiably held responsible. But don't
fret. The demise of responsibility-which materialists have been
predicting for centuries-is not imminent. Advances in neuroscience
and related fields have revealed hitherto unimagined biological causes
that predispose people to behave as they do, 77 but the science typically
supporting the more general and radical claim that conscious will is an
illusion-that we do not act and therefore cannot be responsible-is
either insufficient empirically or does not have the implications
claimed.
Materialism's relentless gnawing at moralism is neither new nor
restricted to science. The philosophy of mind and action has long
contained arguments for various forms of material reductionism and for
eliminative materialism. 78 Both types of conceptual views existed long
before recent discoveries in neuroscience and psychology have so
deepened our understanding of how the brain and nervous system are
constructed and work. Both types of views are extremely controversial.
Most philosophers of mind believe that complete reduction of mind
to biophysical explanation is impossible. 79  Discovering a brain
correlate, or any other cause of an action, for example, does not mean
that it is not motion or stillness caused by mental states. If actions exist,
77 Recently published issues of prestigious journals contain illustrative examples of advances
in scientific understanding of the causes of legally relevant behavior. See, e.g., Avshalom Caspi
et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in Maltreated Children, 297 SCIENCE 851 (2002)
(maltreated male children were more likely to exhibit antisocial behavior if they had a defect in
the genotype that confers high levels of the neurotransmitter encoding enzyme, monoamine
oxidase A, which metabolizes various neurotransmitters linked to violence if the levels of those
neurotransmitters are low); Rita Z. Goldstein & Nora D. Volkow, Drug Addiction and Its
Underlying Neurobiological Basis: Neuroimaging Evidence for the Involvement of the Frontal
Cortex, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1642 (2002) (addiction involves cortical processes that result in
the overvaluation of drug reinforcers, the undervaluation of other reinforcers, and defective
inhibitory control of responses to drugs); J. Kim-Cohen et al., MAOA, Maltreatment, and Gene-
Environment Interaction Predicting Children's Mental Health: New Evidence and a Meta-
Analysis, 11 MOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY 903 (2006) (MAOA gene influences vulnerability to
environmental stress, such as childhood maltreatment); Marc N. Potenza et al., Gambling Urges
in Pathological Gambling: A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study, 60 ARCHIVES OF
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 828, 828 (2003) (when viewing gambling cues, male pathological gamblers
"demonstrate relatively decreased activity in brain regions implicated in impulse regulation
compared with controls"); Murray B. Stein et al., Genetic and Environmental Influences on
Trauma Exposure and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Symptoms: A Twin Study, 159 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1675 (2002) (concluding that genetic factors can influence the risk of exposure to
assaultive trauma and to PTSD symptoms that may ensue).
78 Reductive accounts hold, simply, that mental states are as they seem to us, but that they are
also identical to brain states. Eliminative accounts hold that our beliefs about our mental states are
radically false and, consequently, that no match up between brain states and mental states is
possible. See PAUL M. CHURCHLAND, MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS 26-34, 43-49 (rev. ed.
1988) (explaining the arguments for and against both types of arguments).
79 See, e.g., SEARLE, supra note 12, at 88-92, 111-32; Galen Strawson, Consciousness, Free
Will, and the Unimportance of Determinism, 32 INQUIRY 3 (1989) (claiming that reductive
physicalism about the mind is "moonshine"); see generally JOHN R. SEARLE, THtE REDISCOVERY
OF THE MIND (1992) (providing an extended argument for the irreducible reality of mind).
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they have causes, including those arising in the brain. Again, until the
conceptual revolution that allows us to solve the mind-body problem
occurs-and, at present, we have no idea how the brain enables the
mind80 -science cannot resolve the debate, although it can furnish
support for various conceptual arguments. At present and for the
foreseeable future, we have no convincing conceptual reason from the
philosophy of mind, even when it is completely informed by the most
recent neuroscience, to abandon our view of ourselves as creatures with
causally efficacious mental states.
The real NAT question is whether scientific experiments have
shown that action is rare or non-existent-that conscious will is largely
or entirely an illusion after all. Three kinds of evidence are often
adduced: First, demonstrations that a very large part of our activity is
undeniably caused by variables we are not in the slightest aware of;
second, studies indicating that more activity than we think takes place
when our consciousness is divided or diminished; and third, laboratory
studies that show that people can be experimentally misled about their
causal contribution to their apparent behavior. Neither kind of evidence
offers logical support to NAT, however. Just because a person may not
be aware of all the causes for why he formed an intention does not mean
that he did not form an intention and was not a fully conscious agent
when he did so. Even if human beings were never aware of the causes
of their intentions to act and actions, it would not necessarily follow that
they were not acting consciously, intentionally and for reasons that
make eminent sense to anyone under the circumstances.
Human consciousness can undeniably be divided or diminished by
a wide variety of normal and abnormal causes. 81 We have known this
long before contemporary scientific discoveries of what causes such
states and how they correlate with brain structure and processes. Law
and morality agree that if an agent's capacity for consciousness is non-
culpably diminished, responsibility is likewise diminished. Some
suggest that it is diminished because bodily movements in the absence
of fully integrated consciousness are not "actions. 8 2 Others believe
that apparently goal-directed behavior that is responsive to the
environment, such as sleepwalking, is action, but that it should be
excused because diminished consciousness reduces the capacity for
80 MCHUGH & SLAVNEY, supra note 16, at 1 1-12.
81 See JEFFREY L. CUMMINGS & MICHAEL S. MEGA, NEUROSPSYCHIATRY AND BEHAVIORAL
NEUROSCIENCE 333-43 (2003) (description of dissociative and related states and their causes and
treatments); D. Vaitl et al., Psychobiology of Altered States of Consciousness, 131 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 98 (2005).
82 See, e.g., MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME 49-52, 135-55, 257-58 (1993) (arguing
that cases of compromised consciousness should be treated as non-action); Michael S. Moore,
More on Act and Crime, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1749, 1804-20 (1994) (same).
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rationality. 83 Let us assume that the former view is correct because it
offers more direct support to NAT and, therefore, the greatest challenge
to traditional notions of individual responsibility. Let us also assume
that divided or diminished consciousness is more common than we
think. Nevertheless, neither of these assumptions supports the more
radical, general NAT thesis.
To demonstrate that divided or partial consciousness is more
common than it appears certainly extends the range of cases in which
people are not responsible or have diminished responsibility, but such
studies do not demonstrate that most human bodily movements that
appear intentional and rational-that appear to be rational actions-
occur when the person has altered consciousness. One cannot
generalize to all human behavior from genuinely deviant cases or cases
in which a known abnormality is present. A model of action (or, should
we say, non-action) built on sleepwalking, for example, is hardly a
threat to orthodox notions of individual responsibility.
Last, there is substantial empirical evidence to suggest that
experimental laboratory manipulations of unsuspecting subjects can
cause the subjects to believe that their intentions were producing action
when this was not the case. 84 That subjects can be cleverly mislead by
experimental manipulations hardly indicates that intentions generally
play no role in explaining our behavior.
What is needed to support NAT is a general demonstration that
causal intentionality is an illusion tout court, but no such general
demonstration has yet been produced by scientific study. The most
interesting evidence has arisen from studies done by neuroscientist,
Benjamin Libet,85 which have generated an immense amount of
commentary. 86  Libet's exceptionally creative and careful studies
demonstrate that measurable electrical brain activity associated with
intentional actions occurs about 550 milliseconds before the subject
actually acts and for about 350 to 400 milliseconds before the subject is
consciously aware of the intention to act.
Let us assume, with cautious reservations, 87 the validity of these
83 Morse, supra note 75, at 1641-52 (clouded consciousness should be treated as an
affirmative defense); Bernard Williams, The Actus Reus of Dr. Caligari, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1661
(1994) (same).
84 See John A. Bargh, Bypassing the Will: Toward Demystifying the Nonconscious Control of
Social Behavior, in THE NEW UNCONSIOUS, supra note 28, at 37 (reviewing the evidence and
concluding that the "will" is not primarily responsible for action).
85 Benjamin Libet, Do We Have Free Will, in THE VOLITIONAL BRAIN: TOWARDS A
NEUROSCIENCE OF FREE WILL 47 (Benjamin Libet, Anthony Freeman & Keith Sutherland eds.,
1999) (summarizing the findings and speculating about their implications).
86 CONSCIOUS WILL, supra note 71, at 54-55 (characterizing the recounting of Libet's results
as a "cottage industry" and noting the large and contentious body of commentary).
87 See, e.g., HENRIK WALTER, NEUROPHILOSOPHY OF FREE WILL: FROM LIBERTARIAN
ILLUSIONS TO A CONCEPT OF NATURAL ANATOMY 250-52 (Cynthia Klohr trans., 2001); J. Zhu,
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studies. It does not follow from this temporal ordering that conscious
intentionality does no causal work. It simply demonstrates that non-
conscious brain events precede conscious experience, but this seems
precisely what one would expect of the mind-brain. It does not mean
that intentionality played no causal role, and Libet concedes that people
can "veto" the act, which is another form of mental act that plays a
causal role. Finally, Libet's task involved "random" finger movements
that involved no deliberation whatsoever and no rational motivation.
This is a far cry from the behavioral concerns of the criminal law, which
address intentional conduct in contexts when there is always good
reason to refrain from harming another. Libet's work is fascinating, but
it does not prove that humans are generally not conscious, intentional
agents or capable of employing their conscious intentionality when they
have good reason to do so. 88
Moreover, NAT provides no guidance about what we should do
next and, in any event, degenerates into a self-referential incoherence.
Let us suppose that you were convinced by the mechanistic view that
you were not an intentional, rational agent after all. (Of course, the
notion of being "convinced" would be an illusion, too.89 Being
convinced means that you were persuaded by evidence or argument, but
a mechanism is not persuaded by anything. It is simply neurophysically
transformed.) What should you do now? You know that it is an illusion
to think that your deliberations and intentions have any causal efficacy
in the world. (Again, what does it mean according to the purely
mechanistic view to "know" something? But enough.) You also know,
however, that you experience sensations such as pleasure and pain, and
that you care about what happens to you and to the world. You cannot
just sit quietly and wait for your neurotransmitters to fire. You must
and will of course deliberate and act.
If one still thought that NAT were correct and that standard notions
of genuine moral responsibility and desert are therefore impossible, one
might nevertheless continue to believe that the law would not
necessarily have to give up the concept of "incentives." Through
automatic processes that are not at all well understood, it is possible that
various potential rewards and punishments would have the effect of
Reclaiming Volition: An Alternative Interpretation of Libet's Experiment, 10 J. OF
CONSCIOUSNESS STUD. 61 (2003).
88 See also T. Crane, Ready or Not, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 14, 2005, at 26
(arguing that the new neuroscience rarely has much to contribute when the phenomenon in
question is complex social behavior); Jerry Fodor, Making the connection: Axioms from axons:
why we need to think harder about thinking, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, May 17, 2002, at 3
(models of the brain that implement cognitive psychology are increasingly insufficient as one
moves from peripheral to central cognitive processes).
89 See Daniel C. Dennett, Calling in the Cartesian Loans, 27 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 661
(2004) (wondering, in response to Professor Wegner, who is this "we" that inhabits the brain).
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shaping behavior even if they did not do so as premises in practical
reasoning. Such an account would be consistent with "black box"
accounts of economic incentives. For those who believe that a
thoroughly naturalized account of human behavior entails complete
consequentialism, such a conclusion might not be unwelcome.
On the other hand, this view seems to entail the same internal
contradiction just explored. What is the nature of the "agent" that is
discovering the laws governing how incentives shape behavior? Are
understanding and providing incentives via social norms and legal rules
simply epiphenomenal interpretations of what the brain has already
done? Once again, the NAT account seems to swallow itself.
Moreover, NAT proponents of consequentialism could hardly complain
about those who refuse to "accept" what the proponents think rationality
requires. The allegedly misguided people who resist are simply the
victims of their automatic brain states and cannot be expected
intentionally to use their capacity for reason.
Even if our mental states play no genuinely causal role-about
which, once again, we will never be certain until we solve the mind-
body problem-human beings will find it almost impossible not to treat
themselves as rational, intentional agents unless there are major changes
in the way our brains work. Moreover, as we saw, if you use the truth
of pure mechanism as a premise in deciding what to do, this premise
will entail no particular moral, legal or political conclusions. It will
provide no guide to how one should live, including how one should
respond to the truth of NAT.
Finally, the common sense argument in favor of the justified belief
that we are conscious, intentional creatures is overwhelming. Consider
again, for example, the nature of law itself. As we have seen, law is a
system of rules that at the least is meant to guide or influence behavior
and thus to operate as a potential cause of behavior. It would be
impossible at present for us to abandon the well-justified belief that
action may be influenced by reason and that our intentions are causally
efficacious.
The new neuroscience does not pose, and is unlikely ever to
pose, a real threat to our fundamental conception of personhood and all
that follows from it, including the concept of responsibility and related
concepts, such as mens rea. At the very least, we remain entitled to
presume that conscious intentions are potentially rational and causal,
and to place the burden of persuasion at a very high level on proponents
of NAT. At present, the case has not been proven. We are fully entitled
to continue to believe that we are the sorts of creatures we believe
ourselves to be.
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CONCLUSION
George Fletcher's Grammar is an immense achievement. In the
sections I address, Professor Fletcher confronts the most philosophically
difficult and contentious issues that underpin the core of the criminal
law. Free will and action are "evergreens" that will not vanish as long
as we continue to take ourselves seriously as persons. There are new
challenges to traditional justifications of genuine blame and
punishment, and material scientific views will almost certainly continue
to put pressure on our ordinary conception of personhood. Nonetheless,
our current understanding seems at present secure. This is a comforting
conclusion because so much we value in human life depends on
personhood and related moral and political concepts.
